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1 INTRODUCTION
Models of emotion, particularly those based on the Ortony, Clore,
and Collins (OCC) account of emotions, have been used as part
of agents’ decision making processes to explore their effects on
cooperation within social dilemmas [7, 19, 22]. We analyse two
different interpretations of OCC agents. Firstly, Emotional agents
that decide their action using only a model of emotions. To analyse
the possibility of evolutionary stability of these agents we use the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We contrast the results with the second
interpretation of an OCC agent, the Moody agent [7], which addi-
tionally uses a psychology-grounded model of mood. Our analysis
highlights the different strategies that are needed to achieve success
as a society in terms of both stability and cooperation, in the iter-
ated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Emotional agents are better suited
playing against a mixed group of agents with differing strategies
than the Moody agents are. The Moody agents are more successful
than the Emotional agents when only one strategy exists in the
society.
2 BACKGROUND
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a social dilemma, popularised through
the influential Axelrod’s tournament [2], where two players pick
between cooperating with the other player, or trying to take ad-
vantage. A strategy can be described as evolutionarily stable when
the majority of agents are using the strategy, and it cannot be in-
vaded by any initially rare strategy [24]. Evolutionary stability in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma has been extensively analysed [4, 25], with
no pure strategy, TIT-FOR-n-TATS, or reactive strategies being evo-
lutionarily stable in the iterated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
[5, 9, 20]. Evolutionary stability is an extremely demanding criterion.
Our Emotional and Moody agents differ from previous analyses of
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strategies in this problem set, as they are able to identify individual
opponents and change their actions based on the individual, and
have a memory extending further than the previous interaction.
Table 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix. Cooperate (C),
Defect (D).
C, C D, D D, C C, D
3, 3 1, 1 5, 0 0, 5
2.1 Emotional agents
We look at the intuition behind evolutionary stability of Emo-
tional agents described by Lloyd-Kelly et al [18], as the majority
of previous work focussed on experimental studies only [7, 16, 18].
These emotional agents use the OCC model of emotions [22] from
the psychology literature. Various agent designers have used this
model successfully as part of their agents’ decision making process
[1, 7, 19, 23]. While the thresholds which trigger emotions can be
much larger than those previously defined [17], the thresholds are
restricted to lower values to reflect how emotions are short-term
[15].
2.2 Moody Agents
The Moody agents we will be analysing use the same OCC model
as used in the Emotional agents, but in addition they also use a
model of mood [6]. Mood is represented as a real number, with
lower values representing more depressed moods and higher values
representing more positive moods. This reflects how psychologists
have represented human mood [3, 8, 10, 12, 13]. The mood value
places the mood into one of five possible mood levels (very high,
high, neutral, low, very low). The mood value will then affect the
action selection of the agent, as inspired by the psychology liter-
ature [11, 14]. A full description of the model, and its psychology
grounding, is given in Collenette et al. [6].
3 OVERVIEW OF EVOLUTIONARY
STABILITY ANALYSIS
To analyse whether Emotional and Moody agents can be considered
an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), we need an opponent strat-
egy that will take the largest advantage of the agents, minimising
Extended Abstract AAMAS 2019, May 13-17, 2019, Montréal, Canada
1889
their payoff. We will use a strategy termed the Oracle. The effective-
ness of the strategy is achieved by breaking an assumption of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, namely that players have no knowledge of the
opponent’s move, as reflected by the name. Intuitively the Oracle
strategy will always cooperate with itself, and when faced with
another strategy will choose the worst outcome for the opponent,
effectively making it the worst case scenario for the opponent. The
Oracle strategy targets the conditions needed to be an ESS, allowing
effective analysis of evolutionary stability. The Oracle is the most
effective strategy at minimising the payoff of the Emotional agents.
3.1 Emotional Agents
Statement 1. Emotional Agents are not an ESS initially
Emotional agents are initially cooperative. The Oracle agents are
able to take advantage of this, defecting against only the Emotional
agents. The Oracle will then have a larger payoff than the Emotional
agents as they will receive only the 3 payoff or the 5 payoff, while
the Emotional agents will receive with a 3 or a 0. The Oracle will
have a greater average payoff making Statement 1 valid.
Statement 2. Emotional agents converge to defection against all
Oracle agents given a sufficiently high number of interactions and
randomness in pairing.
The Oracle agents will defect against the Emotional agents. The
Emotional agents are guaranteed to change to defection given suffi-
cient time to adjust [7]. This is due to theOracle agent only defecting
against the Emotional agent. If the Emotional agent cooperates then
the Oracle will defect to take advantage, if the Emotional agent
defects then the Oracle will also defect to protect its payoff. The
outcome will always cause the Emotional agent to change to defec-
tion as the emotional trigger for defection will always be triggered.
Given that the Emotional agents interact with all Oracle agents
enough to cause the emotional trigger to fire, then we can guarantee
Statement 1.
Statement 3. Initially cooperative Emotional agents, with fast
interactions and slow reproduction are an ESS.
All initially cooperative Emotional agents will cooperate with
each other indefinitely [6]. When two Emotional agents are in
mutual cooperation, such as when the two Emotional agents are
both initially cooperative, the emotional trigger to switch to defect
never gets fired. The Oracle agents also have perfect cooperation
among themselves. Given Statement 2 is true, then we now know
that the Oracle is always be defecting against all Emotional agents.
Therefore the Oracle agents and the Emotional agents will both be
receiving the same payoff when interacting with an agent that uses
the same strategy or the opposing strategy. As an ESS requires that
the Emotional agents are a majority in the society, the expected
payoff of the Emotional agents will therefore be higher than the
Oracle agent, making Statement 3 valid.
In summary, we can show that with some assumptions, initially
cooperative Emotional agents are possibly an ESS. This is significant
as no strategy is able to minimise the payoff of the Emotional agents
more than the Oracle agent.
3.2 Moody Agents
Moody agents have the additional Mood model on top of the emo-
tions which changes how the Moody agents react. We need to
analyse each mood level individually in terms of an ESS. We will
assume that the Moody agents are initially cooperative and that
the mood levels do not change over time.
Statement 4. Moody agents in an initially very high mood, ini-
tially low mood, or initially very low mood are not an ESS
Moody agents in a very high mood, or a very low mood are func-
tionally equivalent to a full cooperation strategy, or a full defection
strategy, both of which are known to not be an ESS [5, 20]. Low
moods defect against new opponents, meaning the Moody agents
will not cooperate together, lowering their expected payoff below
the Oracle agent’s.
Statement 5. Moody agents that are in an initially high mood,
or initially neutral mood are functionally equivalent to Moody agents
in a neutral mood.
Neutral moods do not change the action selection; as the Moody
agent is initially cooperating there is no change in action when the
Moody agent is in a high mood. As there is no change in action
selection then the Emotional agents’ analysis applies, making these
mood levels an ESS. To validate this claim the mood levels should
never leave either the high mood or neutral mood levels.
Statement 6. Moody agents in an initially neutral or initially
high mood will move to the very high mood level, when there is a
sufficiently small invasion of Oracle agents.
When two moody agents cooperate together both of their mood
values will increase; when they meet an Oracle agent the mood
level will go down as they have been taken advantage of. Since
there is a majority of Moody agents, the mood values will reach the
very high mood levels. Therefore the Moody agents are not an ESS.
In conclusion we can say that overall Moody agents are not an
ESS. If the mood level of Moody agents was to stay stable over time,
this would go against the design principles of the model [6]. The
psychological grounding of the moody model requires that mood
levels change over time as per the psychology literature [8, 21].
4 CONCLUSION
We have described how Emotional agents that use a model of emo-
tions as part of their decision-making can be considered an ESS
when they initially cooperate with new partners and are able to
adapt to an invading strategy before reproducing. Moody agents
using a simulated model of mood and a model of emotions as their
decision-making process, are not an ESS. Some mood levels break
the assumption that Moody agents mutually cooperate. We tested
both these agents against an Oracle strategy, minimising the ex-
pected payoff of the Emotional agents. The Oracle strategy can
successfully invade the Moody agents. We aim to now formalise
the statements with full proofs, including a proof for the Oracle
agent minimising the payoff of the Emotional agents. The majority
of the literature concerning these kinds of agents focuses on simu-
lations and observing the effects. We have taken a broader view of
human-inspired agents by analysing evolutionary stability in an
account that implements both Emotional and Moody agents.
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